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The Limits of Scientific Explanation and the No-Miracles Argument






	Are there limits to scientific explanation?  This question can be understood in at least two ways.  If we take the question to mean ‘Is there anything science will never be able to explain?’, then the answer is vexed at best.  It is not clear that we even have a well-posed question in the neighborhood, since it may presuppose something akin to a convergent final science—a contestable supposition.  However, this question can also be interpreted as: ‘Are there explanations that scientists will not accept—even though those explanations generate no contradiction with other accepted scientific beleifs?’  The answer to that question, I shall argue, is yes.  Under certain circumstances, scientists reject attempts to explain a given part of the scientific corpus, even though the proposed explanations do not conflict with experimental results or contemporary theory.  I will present and discuss several cases, current and historical, in which scientists do not accept an explanation on the grounds that it outstrips the bounds of legitimate scientific explanation. 
	This paper has two objectives.  First, I present a general characterization of one type of explanation that scientists are unwilling to accept, illustrating this characterization with historical and contemporary examples.  Second, I argue that scientific realism, as it appears in the ‘no-miracles’ argument (NMA), fits this account of unacceptable explanations.  (This version of realism holds that “theories accepted in a mature science are typically approximately true” (Putnam 1975, 73).)  Therefore, if one accepts the form of naturalism expounded by most leading proponents of the NMA (e.g. Putnam, Boyd, Psillos), in which philosophers of science are entitled to all and only the methods of inquiry used by practicing scientists, then philosophers of science should not accept scientific realism on the basis of the NMA.  The argument can be summarized as follows:
(P1) Scientists do not accept explanations that explain only one already accepted fact.

(P2) Scientific realism (as it appears in the NMA) explains only one type of already accepted fact—namely, the empirical adequacy or instrumental success of mature scientific theories.  

(P3) Naturalistic philosophers of science “should employ no methods other than those used by the scientists themselves” (Psillos 1999, 78). 

Therefore, naturalistic philosophers of science should not accept scientific realism (as it appears in the NMA).

2. Where are the boundaries of legitimate scientific explanation?
	In order to provide a naturalistic account of the limits of scientific explanation, we must examine various explanations that scientists do not accept, relative to a given body of scientific knowledge at a given time.  This relativization to the current background knowledge is necessary, since what is inexplicable today has the potential to be explained by tomorrow’s experimental or theoretical discoveries.  Some attempted explanations are rejected because the explanans, considered in conjunction with the relevant initial conditions and background knowledge, persistently leads to conflict with robust experimental results.  Other proposed explanations are not accepted because they are inconsistent, in letter or spirit, with other currently accepted scientific claims.  Yet other explanations are not accepted because a simpler alternative explanans is available that can account equally well (whatever that may mean) for the same explananda.  I shall ignore explanations with these sorts of faults.  
There are explanations that do not suffer from these defects, yet are nonetheless not accepted by scientists.  I do not pretend to have a complete list of all the unacceptable types of explanations, but the following is one: 
(P1) Scientists do not accept explanations that explain only one already accepted fact.
  
The fact to be explained can be either particular, such as the failure of New Orleans’ levee system in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, or general, such as the fact that all mammals have hair.  Such unacceptable explanations 
(i) do not unify apparently disparate facts [‘explain only one…’ in (P1)], and 

(ii) do not generate (in conjunction with available background knowledge) new predictions, i.e., predictions that could not be made without assuming the explanans-statement [‘… already accepted fact’].

The content of (P1) and its corollaries (i) and (ii) can best be understood by considering a concrete example.  Virtus dormativa explanations, which are virtually universally rejected, meet the description of unacceptable explanations outlined in (P1). Suppose it is an accepted fact that opium tends to put people to sleep.  ‘Explaining’ this fact by postulating a dormative virtue in the opium generates no new predictions, over and above the predictions that can be made from the explanandum (‘Opium puts people to sleep’) alone.  Additionally, this explanans unifies no facts that are not already unified by the explanandum.​[1]​  
Note that the two claims ‘Opium makes John sleepy’ and ‘Opium makes Jane sleepy’ are already unified by the claim ‘Opium makes people sleepy’ (if they are unified at all); they are not further unified by postulating the existence of a dormative virtue in the opium.  This contrasts sharply with Newton’s claim that a universal attractive force inheres in every material body in the universe, a claim which explains not only the observed motions of the planets around the sun, but also the behavior of freely falling bodies near the Earth’s surface, the paths of comets, and tidal phenomena.  One might object that the real problem with virtus dormativa-style explanations is not that they explain only one previously established fact, but that they are in some sense fundamentally circular and therefore vacuous.  I appreciate the force of this complaint (though virtus dormativa explanations’ unacceptability may be overdetermined).  Therefore, the remainder of this section adduces patently non-circular examples in support of (P1).

2.1. Driesch’s vitalism  
One example of an unacceptable explanation that supports (P1) comes from scientists who argued for the existence of some sort of vital force in animals from the 18th to the early 20th centuries.  There were certain facts of organic development that did not appear to be amenable to explanation in mechanical, physico-chemical terms.  For example, Hans Driesch, working at the turn of the 20th century, discovered that sea urchin embryos that were halved at a very early stage of development could still generate two normally proportioned (though somewhat smaller) adult urchins.  He later discovered other organisms, such as water hydrae, had similar abilities to develop into normal adult forms even when the cells of the early forms were perturbed in various ways.  In order to explain his observations of the sea urchin and other organisms, he introduced the concept of an entelechy: a non-physico-chemical causal factor that directs the overall development of the organism from a simple zygote into a complex and integrated complete adult.​[2]​  After presenting his sea urchin findings, Driesch writes that “we are required to accept a new kind of elementary… process, because no machine produced by physical and chemical means can be contrived as the basis for the events in question” (Driesch 1899, quoted in Sander 1992, 3).  No such machine is possible, Driesch thinks because “a machine… cannot remain itself if you remove parts of it or rearrange its parts at will” (1929, 104).  Put simply, a dishwasher or car that has been halved cannot still function as a dishwasher or car, so the developing embryo cannot be a machine, since the functioning of a whole machine depends essentially upon the presence and functioning of the parts.  
For Driesch, as the first of the above quotations indicates, the entelechy’s existence is justified on the grounds of its apparent explanatory power: such an entity guiding development would explain facts that were previously unexplained and/or considered unexplainable.  In “natural science,” Driesch claims, “something new and elemental must always be introduced whenever what is known of other elemental facts is proved to be unable to explain the facts in a new field of investigation” (1929, 105). Despite the fact that the vitalistic hypothesis explained these otherwise unexplained facts, most of Driesch’s contemporaries did not accept his hypothesis (Sander 1992, 1993), and virtually all scientists today would reject the introduction of an entelechy—despite the fact that there are still unexplained developmental facts.  Driesch’s critics observed that introducing entelechies into the scientific account of embryonic development did not generate any new testable claims, and Driesch agreed (Jennings 1912, 435).  Furthermore, positing a specific entelechy for each species does not unify apparently disparate facts. First, each species requires its own specific entelechy—that is, we must posit as many distinct entelechies as there are species of organisms.  Second, the claims ‘Sea urchins can develop normally when halved at an early stage of development’ and ‘Hydrae can develop normally when halved at an early stage of development’ are unified by the inductive generalization that ‘Many (or all) organisms can develop normally if halved at an early stage of development.’  There is no further unification added if we claim that each organism has an entelechy that regulates its development.  This is analogous to the virtus dormitiva case, in which the two facts that opium makes John sleepy and makes Jane sleepy are unified by the inductive generalization opium makes everyone sleepy—and these two facts are not further unified by postulating a virtus dormitiva in the opium.
 
2.2. Kepler’s nested solids model
The centerpiece of Kepler’s Mysterium Cosmographicum provides another example of an explanation that is both unacceptable and explains only one already-accepted fact.  In the preface, Kepler writes: “There were three things in particular, about which I persistently sought the reasons why they were such and not otherwise: the number, the size, and the motions of the heavenly spheres” (1596/1981, 63).  That is, Kepler wants to explain why there were exactly six [sic] planets (instead of five, or seven, or…), and why the distances between the planets are what they are.  To explain why there are six planets, he appeals to the five perfect (Platonic) solids: if these five were nested one inside the other, and there were globes in between each as well as inside the innermost solid and outside the outermost, there would be one globe for each of the six planets’ (average) orbital paths.  And if the solids are ordered properly, the distance between the planets’ orbits approximately matches the distance between these globes.  These two explanations are clearly not ones scientists would accept—in our time, or (for the most part) in Kepler’s (Caspar 1950/1959, 69-71).  Each explanans-parameter explains exactly one previously accepted fact: correlating the five Platonic solids to six planetary orbs ‘explains’ nothing more than why there are six planets, and the particular ordering of the nested solids ‘explains’ nothing but the previously known (approximate) distances between the planets.  Furthermore, note that neither explanans generates new experimental predictions or unifies apparently disparate realms of previously accepted facts.

2.3. ‘Just-so’ evolutionary stories
	A third example of an explanation that scientists do not accept is the ‘just-so story’ about the evolutionary histories of traits observed today.  Critics of adaptationism claim that adaptationists’ explanations of current traits are just-so stories (most famously in (Gould and Lewontin 1978)), whereas adaptationists claim that this characterization is an unfair caricature of their work.  Whether adaptationists’ work actually resembles just-so stories enough to condemn it is irrelevant for present purposes: both sides to the dispute agree that just-so stories should not be accepted.  A just-so evolutionary story has the following form: from the existence of a certain trait T observed in an organism today, infer that a certain set of selective pressures P that would favor selection of T operated on the organism’s ancestors (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, 243).  In the caricature version of adaptationism, the only evidence that the selective pressures P existed is that we observe trait T now.  Under those circumstances, pressures P constitute an explanation of a single already accepted fact (namely, the observed trait T).  
Both adaptationists and their critics agree that, in order for any particular evolutionary explanation to be scientifically acceptable, there must be more evidence for the explanans than merely the present trait it was introduced to explain.   Gould writes:
Not all sociobiology proceeds in the mode of storytelling for individual cases.  It rests on firmer methodological ground when it seeks broad correlations across taxonomic lines, as between reproductive strategy and distribution of resources, for example, or when it can make testable, quantitative predictions. (Gould 1978, 531) 

Current evolutionary psychologists are often accused of telling just-so stories.  However, leading evolutionary psychologists, such as Leda Cosmides, reject this accusation.  She holds that her theories are not explanations that explain only one already accepted phenomenon:
the method of evolutionary psychology outlined here… is hypothetico-deductive, rather than speculative.  In a speculative approach, one first discovers a psychological mechanism, and then one speculates about what adaptive problem it evolved to solve.  The approach advocated here is the reverse… It is a constrained and predictive approach, rather than a compilation of post hoc explanations for known phenomena. (1989, 190)

What Cosmides calls the ‘speculative’ method is precisely the kind of explanation I am claiming that scientists reject.  She holds that her theories do stand on what Gould called ‘firmer methodological ground,’ since they make new predictions, and even reveal “previously unknown cognitive features” (Cosmides and Tooby 1995, 91) that are given a unified treatment (instead of being a ‘post hoc compilation’) within her theory. As Elisabeth Lloyd points out (1999, 212), both the adaptationists and their critics agree on what an acceptable explanation looks like in the abstract: it must make new predictions and/or provide a unified account of apparently different phenomena (such as Gould’s ‘broad correlations across taxonomic lines’).  The dispute is primarily whether particular adaptationist explanations meet these abstract methodological standards.  ‘Just-so stories,’ along with vitalism, Kepler’s spheres, and virtus dormitiva explanations, are all intended to illustrate and substantiate (P1): an explanans that explains only a single piece of established data is not considered scientifically acceptable—even if it is the only explanans currently available.  As Lipton (2004) says, proper abductive reasoning only permits inference to the best explanation when the best is good enough—if our best explanans for some fact fails to meet a minimal threshold for explanatory goodness, abductive reasoners should not accept it.  My claim is that the four cases presented in this section fail to meet this minimal standard.
Cases of scientifically unacceptable explanations that fit (P1) could be multiplied.  A prominent recent example is Intelligent Design (ID) theory.  We again see the same pattern as we saw in Driesch and the others: ID’s proponents point to some heretofore (supposedly) unexplained but accepted fact, such as the blood-clotting cascade or the motor of bacterial flagella, and claim that the existence of an intelligent designer who intervened to create the cascade would explain these previously unexplained facts.  There is not space here to delve into the details of ID or other unacceptable explanations that fit the pattern of (P1); we must turn to defending (P1) from pressing objections.  

3. Objections and Replies
3.1. Examples’ unacceptability misdiagnosed	
One might grant that all four of the above cases are scientifically unacceptable, but object that I have not properly identified the true causes of their unacceptability.  For example, one could argue that the only reason scientists reject entelechies is that they are non-physical entities that act upon the physical world, and such a form of causation is unintelligible or unscientific—and therefore the fact that it meets condition (P1) is irrelevant.  This was the professed rationale of Driesch’s contemporary, Wilhelm Roux, for rejecting the concept of entelechy: “since it is presumed to rule over material structure like a sovereign, this entelechy is not acceptable to exact natural science” (1912, 241).  Similarly, Kepler’s explanation of the number and distances of the planets is motivated by the assumption that a conscious, beneficent being created the universe (Kepler 1596/1981, 63).  What is fundamentally unacceptable in Kepler’s case, the objector alleges, is the theological motivation and grounding of the nested-solids explanation.  And virtus dormitiva explanations, as mentioned above, could be dismissed on the grounds of being covertly circular (whatever that might mean).  So these cases are problematic because they are metaphysical, theological, or circular—not because they qualify under (P1) as unacceptable explanations.
This is a serious objection; I offer two replies.  First, in the case of just-so stories, the hypotheses concerning the environments of our Pleistocene ancestors lack the metaphysics or theology found in Driesch and Kepler.  Thus, even if objection as stated above is accepted, I can fall back on the just-so stories example to substantiate (P1).  Second, the reason scientists today reject certain theological and metaphysical accounts of phenomena may be that such accounts generate no new predictive content and fail to genuinely unify disparate phenomena.  If the posit of entelechies could be used to make novel empirical predictions that could not be made without it, then scientists could conceivably accept it—just as quantum mechanics, with all its counterintuitive strangeness, is accepted.  Similarly, any theological hypothesis that generated new predictive content could be (at least arguably) considered scientific.  In short, theology and metaphysics may be considered extra-scientific because they lack both predictive and unifying power.

3.2. Successful ad hoc hypotheses
	One might object to (P1) by pointing to the phenomenon of what can be called ‘successful ad hoc hypotheses.’  When a scientific theory appears to conflict with some piece of data, defenders of the theory often generate an ad hoc hypothesis in order to ‘save’ the theory.  The ad hoc hypothesis is introduced solely to ‘explain away’ the anomalous observation.  In general, scientists cast a disapproving eye upon ad hoc maneuvers; this general tendency is further evidence for (P1).  However, in some cases, ad hoc hypotheses are eventually vindicated, leading to unforeseen discoveries—the well-worn example of the discovery of Neptune via an apparent violation of Newton’s laws illustrates this point vividly.  LeVerrier and Adams suggested the existence of a planet beyond Uranus, on the grounds that the existence of such a planet would explain exactly one accepted fact: the observed anomalous behavior of Uranus.  Such successful ad hoc hypotheses appear to provide a counter-example to my claim that scientists do not accept explanations that explain only one previously accepted fact.  
However, when scientists accepted the hypothesis that a planet existed beyond Uranus, it was not solely on the grounds that the Uranus data were anomalous—the later, direct telescopic observation of the new planet triggered the widespread acceptance of the hypothesis.  Thus, the hypothesis of a planet beyond Uranus is not like the three cases above, for it generated new empirical predictions that were vindicated, and thus does not rest on a single source of evidence, but on two: both the apparent anomalies in Uranus’s behavior, and the telescopic observations of a planet in the predicted place.  Other successful ad hoc hypotheses likely have the same structure: although they may be initially introduced to account for a single kind of evidence, they will be accepted only when they generate new, testable predictions that are independently corroborated, thereby receiving evidential support from a source different from the original one.

4. Application to the realism debate
	The previous sections argued that scientists do not accept certain types of explanations. This section aims to show that the no-miracles argument for scientific realism is an explanation of this unacceptable sort.  The NMA is, according to its most prominent defenders, an instance of inference to the best explanation (IBE), also known as abductive inference.​[3]​  The basic form of abductive inference is: 
(1)	 p
(2)	q is the best explanation of p
	q 

How does the NMA instantiate this schema?  The target explanandum (p above) is, in Psillos’s words, “the overall empirical success of science” (1999, 71), i.e., mature scientific theories make many accurate observable predictions (or are ‘empirically adequate,’ or ‘instrumentally successful’).  The proponent of the NMA claims that the empirical success of mature theories is best explained by the truth or approximate truth of such theories.  The claim that mature scientific theories are approximately true is an indispensable part of the thesis of scientific realism, for proponents of the NMA.  Then, because IBE licenses the inference from a fact to its best explanation, the NMA proponent infers scientific realism from the mature sciences’ empirical success. The inference can be cast, following the schema above, as follows:
(1)	Mature scientific theories are empirically successful.
(2)	The (approximate) truth of mature scientific theories is the best explanation of their empirical success.
	Mature scientific theories are (approximately) true. [‘Scientific realism’]

(This account of the NMA closely follows (Psillos 1999, 71).)
Part of the appeal of the NMA, for its proponents, is that it is supposedly part of a thoroughly naturalistic philosophy of science, where ‘naturalism’ is the view that “the epistemology of science should employ no methods other than those used by the scientists themselves” (Psillos 1999, 73).  Similarly, Boyd writes: “[t]he epistemology of empirical science is an empirical science” (1989, 13).  On this view, the philosopher who argues for scientific realism uses the same methods and epistemological standards as a scientist who abductively infers the existence of a new type of fundamental particle.  Doppelt puts the point clearly: “Explanationists [= NMA proponents] adopt a naturalistic stance in epistemology and claim that their scientific realism is a scientific hypothesis justified by the very sort of abductive inference (IBE) effectively employed by scientists in producing knowledge” (2005, 1079).  Since science is rife with abductive inference, Putnam claims that scientific realism is “viewed… as part of the only scientific explanation of the success of science, and hence as part of any adequate description of science and its relations to its objects” (1975, 73, my italics).  Boyd makes a nearly identical claim (1989, 9). 
	However, the type of explanation the NMA relies upon to explain the empirical success of science is exactly the kind of explanation, discussed in section 2, that scientists do not accept.​[4]​  Thus, Putnam and Boyd are wrong to claim that realism is a “scientific explanation.”  Realism generates no new empirical predictions over and above those made by scientific theories themselves, taken singly or en masse: quantum electrodynamics makes certain experimental predictions, but adding ‘QED is (approximately) true (and not merely empirically adequate)’ to the standard formulation of QED yields no new predictions.  Similarly, adding the thesis of scientific realism to the conjunction of all our mature scientific theories (whichever those may be) does not generate any novel predictions either.  Doppelt writes:
explanationists do not use a novel-prediction standard in giving their own naturalistic justification of scientific realism. Psillos and other explanationists clearly assume that the ability of… scientific realism, properly formulated, instantaneously to explain already well-known phenomena—the success of science—can confirm it and make it empirically successful, independently of novel prediction. (2005, 1080)

It is widely held that epistemic force accrues to scientific theories, at least in part, because they make novel predictions that are borne out.  The thesis of scientific realism, as it appears in the NMA, enjoys no such probative force.  Furthermore, scientific realism does not unify any previously disparate facts, in the way that Newton’s law of universal gravitation unifies patterns in terrestrial free fall, the paths of planets and comets, and tidal behavior.  Scientific realism, as it occurs in the NMA, is an explanation of only one fact, viz. the ‘overall empirical success of mature sciences.’  
The proponent of the NMA might object as follows: scientific realism unifies the empirical success of particle physics with the empirical success of evolutionary biology, organic chemistry, and so on.  Thus, the objector continues, scientific realism does rest on different sources of evidence, so the NMA is not akin to the objectionable kinds of explanations scientists are unwilling to accept.  However, this apparent unification is spurious: it is analogous to a vitalist claiming that because sea urchins, water hydrae, and other organisms all can develop into more mature forms despite perturbations in their early embryonic stages, positing an entelechy for each organism provides a unified account for these regularities. As discussed earlier, the fact that several organisms have this developmental ability may well provide evidence for the inductive generalization that all organisms have similar capacities.  However, the fact that many organisms can survive such perturbations does not provide evidence that the cause of this ability in each species is an entelechy. The analogy should be clear: the empirical successes of general relativity, organic chemistry, and evolutionary biology provide evidence for the inductive generalization all mature sciences are empirically successful, but any substantive ‘unifying work’ is done at the level of this inductive generalization—which is the explanandum of scientific realism.  No additional unification is achieved by adding ‘…and these mature sciences are (approximately) true.’

5. Conclusion: relation to other criticisms of realism
	Finally, I will briefly compare the complaint lodged here against the no-miracles argument to other extant criticisms of scientific realism.  First, Fine and van Fraassen have argued against using IBE to defend scientific realism.  Fine’s primary complaint is that the realist’s appeal to abductive inference is circular, since an anti-realist challenges the claim that abductive inferences to (e.g.) the existence of quarks yield (approximate) truth (1991, 82).  Van Fraassen presents arguments that challenge the truth-conduciveness of IBE (1989, 142-146); elsewhere, he suggests that IBE could be interpreted as delivering claims that are merely empirically adequate, not true (1980, 71-72).  My complaint with the abductive reasoning employed in the NMA is distinct from these criticisms.  I have not attacked or defended abductive reasoning in general, or discussed whether its deployment in defense of realism is circular.  My claim is that there is a very specific kind of abductive inference that scientists do not accept—and that the NMA is of that kind.
	Second, one may wonder what relation the preceding bears to the vexed distinction, which has dominated the realism debate, between the observable and the unobservable.  Clearly, many of the abductively-inferred claims that scientists do not accept involve unobservable entities, such as Driesch’s entelechies.  However, if what I have claimed above is correct, such claims are not rejected on the grounds that they traffic in the unobservable.  The observable/ unobservable distinction is a morass, and widely considered an uninteresting morass.  I consider it an advantage of the above argument that it challenges realism without directly setting foot in the observable/ unobservable swamp, and re-focuses the realism debate upon the question of the proper limits of scientific explanation.  I am not the first to suggest this line of attack on scientific realism; we see it in The Scientific Image:
[S]cience, in contrast to scientific realism, does not place an overriding value on explanation in the absence of any gain for empirical results…the point is that the demand on science is not for explanation as such.
	(1980, 34)
Van Fraassen’s critics have tended to focus their attacks on the observable/ unobservable distinction.  I have attempted here to spell out and begin to substantiate a more promising argument against realism that vindicates van Fraassen’s view that realists’ explanations outstrip the limits of proper scientific explanation. 
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^1	  I am not committed to any particular account of unification; my argument only requires that there is such a thing as unification in science.  Also, I am neutral on the question of whether unification captures the ‘essence’ of explanation.
^2	  Driesch characterizes the entelechy as “the relation of localities in the absolutely normal case” of the organism (1929, 91).
^3	  Magnus and Callender (2004, 232), in their critique of the NMA, cast the argument in probabilistic, instead of explanatory, terms.  Thus, instead of the premise ‘The truth of mature scientific theories best explains their success,’ they substitute ‘The probability that a theory is true, given that it is empirically successful, is close to 1.’ The difference between explanatory considerations with probabilistic ones matters, if we accept Lipton’s (2004) claim that IBE should be understood as inference to the loveliest explanation, not the likeliest one.  ((Magnus and Callender 2004) does not cite any proponents of the NMA who explicitly endorse the probabilistic version of the argument.)
^4	  I am not claiming that a naturalist should consider ‘Mature scientific theories are (approximately) true’ to be false—rather, a naturalist should not accept it, which obviously includes the case of withholding judgment.
